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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
August Ludwig Hülsen's virtually forgotten "Prüfung der von der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin 
aufgestellten Preisfrage: Was hat die Metaphysik seit Leibniz und Wolf für Progressen gemacht?" (1796, J. 
F. Hammerich, Altona) is the first German idealist system in which reason is conceived of as developing in 
history according to speculative rule based on the logical resolving of contradictions. Notwithstanding, 
Hülsen's work is up to this day almost entirely unknown to most scholars in the field. This paper outlines 
the fundamental aspects of Hülsen's system and targets two of its main innovations: (1) the deduction of 
the transcendental possibility of rational historicity, and (2) the systematic historization of Fichte's 
concept of judging activity; the constitutive equivalent of consciousness' logical-temporal substrate. 
 
Hülsen wrote his only book, the so-called Preisschrift, under the strong influence of Fichte, whose disciple 
he was.1 One of Hülsen’s major purposes was to ground systematically the historical intellectual process 
that led to the Wissenschaftslehre. Hülsen's preliminary assumption is that philosophy must have had a 
beginning in time. At a certain stage of his transcendental deduction, Hülsen “injects” an inherent 
temporal dimension to Fichte’s logical-dynamic a priori concept of rationality. For Fichte the 
transcendental system of all knowledge is an ever-existing system. What takes place in time is the 
philosopher’s personal self-reflective articulation or derivation. The rational being creates his own system, 
Fichte holds, by following the supra-historical producing course of action of the Absolute I. Hülsen 
expanded Fichte’s antinomic concept of reason into a historically developing agent. Hülsen’s position was 
that a system of knowledge is simultaneously produced and articulated in time. System to Hülsen appears 
as the final self-reflectively developed outcome of a universal history of reason, the necessary ending 
“chapter” of which contains the entire history of philosophy.2 
 
I .  H ü l s e n ' s  M o r a l  I n c e n t i v e  
 
Hülsen begins his inquiry in Preisschrift by discussing the human condition. Resistance to moral 
perfection characterizes the history of humanity. Nature and the rational being are engaged in a persisting 
heteronomous relation of self-contradiction. Although humanity has already achieved critical or 
“scientific” knowledge in the Wissenschaftslehre, most philosophers ignore this achievement. Ignorance 
of critical knowledge is the cause behind the rational being’s historical inability to determine his will 
autonomously. The Wissenschaftslehre taught that moral improvement demands personal striving after 
self-conscious determination or self-identity. Hülsen argues that ignorance of critical knowledge gives 
vent to a widespread state of philosophical controversies. The later take place among different disputing 
parties or sects. Their exclusive object of dispute is the true universal concept of philosophy. None of 
these rival factions can critically exhaust the derivation or justification of their respective foundational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For an extensive account of Hülsen's life, see Krämer (01), pp. 11-286 
2 Here, I can only point to the fact that Reinhold's early Elementarphilosophie inspired Hülsen's program. For Reinhold's 
systematic connection of system of knowledge and history of philosophy, and its influence on Hülsen, see chapter I and III of 
my “Between Reinhold and Fichte: August Ludwig Hülsen’s Contribution to the Emergence of German Idealism”, KIT 
Scientific Publishing (Formerly Universitätsverlag Karlsruhe), Forthcoming 2011. 
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premises, for Hülsen a key distinctive feature of critical philosophy. Ignorance of critical knowledge results 
in the simultaneous mistaken assertion of the particular standpoints of all these parties as the exclusive 
universal representatives of the only true possible philosophy, and hence, their irreconcilable disputes. 
Now, this historical state of discrepancy or disunity worsens humanities’ moral situation. For it prevents 
an integrative coordination among contending rivals. The recognition of the universal standpoint of the 
Wissenschaftslehre, of the true possibility of increasing self-determination, not only enables a dramatic 
improvement of the moral situation of man. If understood, it enables a universal consensus as to the 
undisputable concept of philosophy, the practical result of which will be a self-determined improvement 
of the communal relations of man.3 
 
Hülsen’s main intention is to teach his reader how to achieve moral perfectibility through self-determined 
coordinated consensus. For this, he holds, a deductive reconstruction of the systematic possibility of 
consciousness is needed. Philosophy's universality assures an exclusive and therefore unquestionable 
position. The Wissenschaftslehre consequently enables a withdrawal from the sphere of partisan disputes, 
namely the achievement of exhaustive philosophical consensus.4 
 
Hülsen shares Fichte’s holistic point of departure. Hülsen, like Fichte, is committed to the contention that 
philosophy must be based on an absolutely self-posited principle. Hülsen however holds that from a 
certain stage on, the system of all knowledge ceases to be a purely a priori or supra-historical system. It 
emerges as the necessary outcome of a simultaneous rational-temporal process of practical-theoretical 
development, the closing “chapter” of which steps through the history of philosophy.5 The deductive 
reconstruction of reason’s history, and of its concluding “chapter”, is Hülsen’s way to justify (1) the 
necessary historical emergence as well as (2) the consensual overcoming of the morally adverse epoch of 
partisan disputes.6 The achievement of moral perfection emerges as the true and inevitable spiritual-
historical vocation (Bestimmung) of man.7 
 
I I .  R a t i o n a l  H i s t o r i c i t y   
 
In its first stages, Hülsen’s deductive reconstruction of consciousness drives heavily on Fichte’s 
presentation of his Wissenschaftslehre in Grundlage, especially its early sections. Reason, a dynamic Geist, 
is in its original supra-historical moment a purely or absolutely self-posited agent; both its absolute 
positing and being coincide. Qua pure reason, reason immediately appears to itself as a self-identical 
agent. The emergence of consciousness (mediation) however demands that this original identity be 
limited or counter-posited. Hülsen hence holds that in its original proto-conscious moment, reason 
cannot recognize itself as the universal self-determined source of its absolutely self-posited being. Its pure 
immediacy prevents it from achieving real autonomy. That compels pure reason to develop a system of 
knowledge. Through it, reason will try to return to itself, achieve a mediated self-positing of itself as reason, 
and attain thereby critical self-determining knowledge of its originally and autonomously self-posited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Hülsen (96), pp. V-VII, 3-8, 136-8, and Flitner (13), p. 32. Hülsen historicizes here Fichte's thought in Ueber die 
Bestimmung des Gelehrten. See Fichte (GA), I, 3, pp. 36-8, 40-1 
4 See Hülsen (96), pp. 29-30 
5 See Ibid., pp. 25-6 
6 See Flitner (13), p. 32 
7 See Hülsen (96), pp. 5, 7 
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being. Reason's innate self-reflective nature determines the necessary circular-teleological character of its 
entire course of development.8 
 
Reason’s next step is to oppose a determining Not-I to itself. Methodical considerations reveal that two 
simultaneous procedures of quantification are necessary to proceed with the construction of the 
transcendental system of knowledge: (1) counter-positing and (2) synthesis. As Hülsen learned from 
Fichte, one of the ensuing results of their establishment is the concrete emergence of the imaginative 
ability of intuitional representation. For Hülsen the system of all knowledge cannot be developed in 
abstracto. It is this actually developed theoretical ability to quantify or self-limit itself through the practical 
self-positing of a spatiotemporal determining object, which determines reason’s abandonment of its pure 
supra-historical sphere and its entrance into the empirical realm of historical development. Reason now 
emerges as a necessary logical-historical developing agent. Pure reason is transformed into empirical or 
progressing reason (empirische or fortschreitende Vernunft). The actual quantifying procedure of self-
limitation results in a simultaneous transformation of reason into a universally self-particularizing agent. 
Thus, the transcendental ground of all individuation is established. From this stage on, the general 
developing history of reason coincides with the historical epistemic development of the concrete 
individual. Progressing reason’s logical-historical ability to produce a system of knowledge should be 
identified with the finite rational being’s concrete teleological ability to strive after self-determination and 
conversely.9 
 
In Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, the deduction of the categories, the faculty of imagination, intuition, and 
the reproductive imagination precede the exhaustive deduction of representation. These transcendental 
instances appear in Fichte’s system as simultaneous moments of the act of quantification. In Hülsen’s 
thought, however, apart from completing quantification and determining the ground of intuitional 
representation, these acts enable a transformation of pure reason (or the Absolute I) into empirical or 
progressing reason. Hülsen does not discuss any of the transcendental instances discussed by Fichte. 
Without disagreeing with Fichte, quantification for Hülsen is that definitive act whereby the Absolute I 
self-determines for itself the synthetic counter-positing of an actual or real object as such. For Hülsen 
quantification should be ascribed the status of an exhaustive imaginative act of intuitional representation. 
All acts that succeed quantification are simply logical-temporal acts accomplished through the self-
reflecting faculty of imagination.10 Hülsen omitted the deduction of these transcendental instances as he 
simply assumed his reader’s familiarity with Fichte’s thought.11 
 
Hülsen's position, I hold, not only enables new understanding of the concept "transcendental", in which 
historicity is integrated as a constitutive moment. It furthermore allows reformulation of the key question 
of critical philosophy, namely how critical knowledge is possible. Hülsen's question is rather how this 
knowledge has become possible.12 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Hülsen (96), pp. 25, 191, 203 
9 See Ibid., pp. 86-94 
10 Klaus Freyer and Jürgen Stahl comment in passing on Hülsen's identification of history and logic. See Freyer/Stahl (84), pp. 
118-9. My supplement to Freyer and Stahl is that Hülsen's insight into quantification and intuitional representation enabled 
reason's transformation into a historically striving agent. 
11 See Langewand (91), p. 112 
12 See Freyer/Stahl (84), p. 118 
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Reason first appears in history as a conditioned representing being (vorstellendes Wesen). Its empirical 
standpoint is characterized by a heteronomous determination of concrete objectivity, by a Not-I that is 
not yet perceived as a subjectively self-posited object. Progressing reason’s next step is to resort to the self-
reflecting activity of the imagination and begin the logical-historical construction of a faculty of judgment. 
This transcendental faculty, judgment, enables the rational being to recognize, discursively, the theoretical 
efficacy of the Not-I as its own practically self-posited product. Expanding the sphere of its self-
determining activity, the rational being frees himself from his first heteronomous historical situation. The 
activity of the imagination makes possible self-reflecting in concreto on an intuited object. Progressing 
reason accordingly subsumes the concrete stage of intuitional representation under its free self-positing 
power. It so determines the ground of the first real possible discursive knowledge. Progressing reason 
establishes all subsequent transcendental levels of the faculty of judgment by repeating this concrete self-
reflective procedure. The three correlative steps that progressing reason takes are: the (1) positing of 
concrete objective reality (thetic judgment), (2) counter-positing of concrete objective reality (anti-thetic 
judgment), and (3) synthesis of concrete objective reality (synthetic judgment). Each one of these 
concretely taken steps determines a logical-historical epoch in the discursive development of humanity.13 
 
According to Hülsen, a series of logical-historical self-reflections enable ascending self-determination of 
the transcendental possibility of the system of knowledge. To attain the status of transcendental 
possibility, each practically produced stage of this system must be concretely self-reflected. Otherwise, the 
last produced stage remains a theoretically undetermined presupposition. What follows, Hülsen claims, is 
a gradual logical-historical process of practical production and subsequent theoretical deduction, the 
developing outcome of which is the self-conscious possibility of critical philosophy. 
 
Hülsen’s position involves the history of reason as a normative amendment of Fichte’s standpoint. Hülsen 
holds that it is not enough to distinguish, as Fichte does, between the concepts of simply general a priori 
productivity embodied in the activity of the Absolute I, and personal a posteriori articulation (self-
determination) embodied in the philosophizing activity of the finite rational being.14 From a certain stage 
all rational activity is general-personal or pure-empirical activity. According to Hülsen, whenever the 
transcendental possibility of a cognitive instance is self-determined, a new instance is produced, whose 
transcendental possibility can, in turn, be deduced in ensuing self-reflecting thought, so revising Fichte’s 
theory of an impersonal or general momentary production of the absolute I only subsequently to be 
uncovered and articulated by the philosophizing activity of individuals. Hülsen’s normative insight 
reconciles two incompatible positions of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. Hülsen so reinterprets Fichte’s 
thesis that the transcendental possibility of this system should be given exclusively by its reality.15 
 
I I I .  T h e  S y s t e m a t i c  H i s t o r i z a t i o n  o f  F i c h t e ' s  C o n c e p t  o f  J u d g i n g  A c t i v i t y   
 
The faculty of judgment furnishes the ground of the first real discursive synthesis. Thus, the 
transcendental possibility of integrative or systematic thought is established. Humanity is now able to start 
the aforementioned “freeing” ascending systematization (discursive self-subsuming and unification) of 
the coercive action of the Not-I. The task of systematization, the logical-historical result of which will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Hülsen (96), pp. 8-9, 12-19. In Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, the ability to judge is preceded by the deduction of the 
understanding. Hülsen omitted this deduction assuming his reader’s familiarity with Fichte’s thought. 
14 For Fichte the conceptual agreement between the atemporal system of knowledge and its concrete temporal presentation 
demands that the Wissenschaftslehre be presupposed, though not as a self-determined object. 
15 See Ibid., pp. 163-4. 
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critical or “scientific” knowledge, takes place through the concrete accumulative repetition of the judging 
stages of thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis. Each new judging stage appears as a higher self-posited form of 
systematic thought. Accordingly, each concrete systematic synthesis results in a higher concrete 
systematic thesis, the concrete counter-positing of which takes place through an ensuing systematic anti-
thesis. Qualitatively, the logically-historically active faculty of judgment cannot develop any further. The 
establishment of the mechanism of judgment opens a new epoch in the history of progressing reason: the 
history of philosophy. Progressing reason is so transformed into philosophizing reason (philosophierende 
Vernunft).16 
 
Hülsen’s deductive reconstruction shows that the objective determining action of the Not-I affects 
philosophizing reason in a number of concrete quantitative ways. Personal intentionality, a particular or 
dissimilar empirical representation of reason’s original being, establishes the possibility for the articulation 
of different philosophical systems.17 
 
All systems of philosophy emerge as ascending and hence not entirely universally determined judging 
attempts of philosophizing reason at a definitive attainment of critical knowledge (self-consciousness). 
Each represents a partial self-reflecting stage of development within a single, universal, and historically 
extended attempt of philosophizing reason at a production and portrayal of a system of knowledge. 
Methodical reconstruction furthermore shows that an empirically reachable, though not fully self-aware 
ideal of philosophical perfection orients philosophizing reason’s teleological course of evolution 
throughout the epoch of pre-critical thought.18 
 
All systems of philosophy attain the status of representative stages of the philosophical progress of 
humanity as a whole. The fact that the same single universal agent strives through different concrete 
thinkers after critical knowledge confers a collective character to each possible particular effort in a 
rational history of philosophy. Accordingly, in their personal practical strivings, all finite rational beings 
meet the same historically emerging standpoints in philosophizing reason’s universal course of 
development. The ongoing practical activity of a reduced number of avant-garde philosophers opens up 
the road for the subsequent general progress of the human species. Progress however demands personal 
reproduction of this avant-garde philosophizing. The necessarily emerging self-conscious standpoint of 
critical philosophy is reproduced as a personal standpoint. In principle, to strive for oneself is tantamount 
as to strive for all other rational beings and conversely. So the systematic possibility for a simultaneous 
development of the intellectual histories of the concrete rational being and humanity is consolidated.19 
 
The history of philosophy is divided in epochs. In each one of these epochs, philosophizing reason 
synthetically counter-posits a determinate number of its ascending systems or products. In Leibniz’s 
epoch, one finds a synthetic counter-positing between the thetically self-posited Leibnizian system –the 
epoch-making system– and the anti-thetically self-posited systems of his contemporary opponents. Each 
thetically self-posited system appears as an unprecedented practical advancement of philosophizing 
reason towards the exhaustive theoretical determination of the system of all knowledge. Thetic systems 
inaugurate new logical-historical stages in the rational history of philosophy. They establish higher forms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Ibid., pp. 19-21, 25 
17 See Ibid., pp. 22-23 
18 See Ibid., pp. 23-24 
19 See Ibid., pp. 72-3, 128-30, 186-7 
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of synthetic unity, the self-reflected or self-subsumed objects of which are the synthetically given, though 
not entirely reconciled counter-positions of their preceding epochs. Apart from the universal and non-
counter-positable system of critical philosophy, each new thetically posited system is counter-posited by 
its contemporary opponents; uncritical or non-universally determined representatives of the only true 
possible "science" as well. This inherent antinomic situation compels philosophizing reason to strive 
forward, and attempt to achieve the universal self-reconciling idea of critical philosophy.20 
 
The antinomically developed character of all systems of philosophy was until Hülsen an unnoticed 
phenomenon. Throughout its pre-critical history, philosophizing reason is not a self-conscious agent. It 
does not grasp itself as the universal relational agent behind its logical-historical production. Its 
synthetically counter-positing activity is mistaken for a non-contextually established opposition or 
contradiction among mutually excluding systematic positions, which appear to the observer only as 
atomic and arbitrarily established facts. That is the reason why what is found throughout this epoch of 
humanity is a persisting dissociating state of philosophical disputes.21 
 
Hülsen expanded Fichte's strategy of systematic grounding and derived benefits for his own historically 
augmented concerns. According to Hülsen, the logical-historical qualitative evolution of the system of all 
knowledge, and hence of its inherently contained history of philosophy, is exhausted with the emergence 
of the distinctive self-conscious insight of critical philosophy. The regressive uncovering of the original 
and absolutely self-grounded I (reason), shows that no additional progressive instances of transcendental 
or qualitative cognition can be added. This exhausts the theoretical grounding of the system of knowledge 
by preventing unconditionally the possibility of further deduction. The logical-historical development of 
this qualitative conditions is carried out in each one of its concrete self-subsuming stages through a 
handling of an ultimately finite quantity (a Not-I). What develop are the logical-historical conditions of 
the system of knowledge but not their inherently self-posited quantities. This enables the systematic 
production and portrayal in concreto of the universal conditions of experience, i.e., transcendental 
grounding of critical philosophy. What remains is a quantitative expansion of these qualitative self-
determining conditions for all possible posited objects of experience: a necessary ensuing procedure 
demanded for the completion of the self-subsuming of the coercive action of the Not-I. Quantitative 
expansion therefore is humanity’s empirical way to attempt to reach the originally, immediately, and 
identically self-posited foundational act of the Absolute I, and thereby achieve exhaustive autonomy. The 
inexhaustible being of the Absolute I compels an unending logical-historical striving task of quantitative 
self-determining approximation, which emerges as the true historical vocation (Bestimmung) of man.22 
 
According to Hülsen, the self-conscious insight of critical philosophy first enables an uncovering of the 
universally self-grounded character of philosophizing reason. Through it, the rational being attains 
concrete theoretical knowledge of how the logically-historically developed system of all knowledge has 
been established. He accordingly gains insight into the self-pursuing (or teleological) ability of striving 
whereby reason has attained critical knowledge. All disputing systems first appear as relative self-posited 
products, or rather as antinomically developed stages of philosophizing reason’s exclusive and universally 
self-posited system of philosophy. The epoch of partisan disputes emerges as a historical material 
condition for the logical production and articulation of the system of all knowledge. The universal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Ibid., pp. 136-7, 148-9 
21 See Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
22 See Ibid., pp. 26-32, 92-3 
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integrative insight of critical philosophy results in a contextual synthesis, the concrete object of which is 
philosophizing reason’s entire pre-critical production. Reason thus suppresses all possible partisan 
atomicity, a theoretical result of its multiple and disparate course of practical development, and thereby 
achieves reconciling self-unity.23 
 
Hülsen's "scientific" historization of Fichte's concept of judging activity enables methodical understanding 
of the mediating role played by each self-posited system in enabling a subsequent holistic step; it allows 
insight into philosophizing reason's logical-temporal modus essendi. Hülsen’s augmented 
Wissenschaftslehre reveals that this universal contextualizing activity of reason, an unnoticed logical-
historical phenomenon in atomized pre-critical thought, is personal consciousness' momentary substrate. 
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